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GUILD FILMS
GUILD FILMS: A SOLUTION UNDER THE
INTRASTATE EXEMPTION
RicHARD D. HAYNES*
The opinion by the Second Circuit in Securities and Exchange Con-
mission v. Guild Films Company, Inc.1 has not been nominated for
an Academy Award by the investment fraternity or bankers, nor has
it received rave reviews from legal scholars. Section 52 of the Securities
Act of 19333 requires that if the mails or interstate commerce are
used to effect an offer4 or sale 5 of securities,6 the securities must either
be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission 7 or the
securities or the transaction by which the sale is effected must be
exempt from the registration requirements of the Acts by a specific
exemption under the Act.9 Violators are subject to both civil10 and
criminal11 penalties and the Commission is armed with injunctive power
to prevent violations of the Act.
12
Although the Act contains no express exemption,'8 prior to Guild
*Attorney, Dallas, Texas. Lecturer on Securities Regulation, Southern Methodist
University Law School, Graduate Division, 1967. A.B. 1953, University of Okla-
homa; LL.B. 1958, Washington and Lee University.
1279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Santa Monica Bank v. SEC,
364 U.S. 819 (1960).
215 U.S.C. § 77e (1963).
815 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, as amended (1966) (hereinafter referred to as the
"Act" and cited by reference to sections of the Act).
4The Act defines offer as including "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value."
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1963).
SThe Act defines sale as including "every contract of sale or disposition of a
security or interest in a security, for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1963).
6The Act defines securities as including "any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, pre-organization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a security, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to
or purchase, any of the foregoing." 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1) (1963).
7The Securities and Exchange Commission is referred to hereafter as the "Com-
mission."
815 U.S.C. § 77j (1963).
915 U.S.C. § 77c (1963) lists those securities which are exempt from registration
and 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1966) lists those transactions which are exempt from
registration.
1015 U.S.C. 5 771 (1963).
"115 U.S.C. § 77x (1963).
1215 U.S.C. 5 77t (1963).
13The Senate originally enacted a clause which exempted from registration sales
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Films it was generally considered 14 that a bona fide pledge of securities
as collateral for a loan did not involve either an offer or a sale and
that a foreclosure sale by a bona fide pledgee of securities put up as
collateral by the issuer 15 or an affiliate' 6 was exempt under § 4(1)17 of
the Act, unless the pledgee himself was in a control relationship' 8 with
the issuer and also used an underwriter' 9 in the disposition of the
securities.
The rationale for this opinion was that § 4(1) of the Act exempts
from the registration requirements "transactions by any person other
than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 20 Construed with § 2(11) of
the Act, which defines underwriter to include a person who pur-
chases from an issuer with a view to distribution, this exemption had
been interpreted to extend to sales by persons who purchase from an
issuer for investment. 21 Before Guild Films, most legal writers were
of securities "by or for the account of a pledge holder or mortgagee selling or
offering for sale or delivery in the ordinary course of business and not for the
purpose of avoiding the provisions of the Act, to liquidate a bona fide debt,
a security pledged in good faith as collateral for such debt." However, this pro-
vision was not included in the final bill passed by Congress. S. REP. No. 875, 73d
Cong., lst Sess. § 12 (b) (1933).
14Loss, SFcuRams REGULATION 645 (2d ed. 1961), Loss, SECURMTIES REGULAToN
346 (1st ed. 1951) and Throop and Lane, Some Problems of Exemption under the
Securities Act of 1933, 4 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 89, 124 (1937); cf. Sargent,
Pledges and Foreclosure Rights under the Securities Act of 1933, 45 VA. L. REv.
885 (1959).
15The Act defines issuer as "every person who issues or proposes to issue any
security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1963).
16Rule 405 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant
to the Act defines affiliate as "a person that directly, or indirectly through one or
more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control
with, the person specified." 17 C.F.R. § 203.405 (a) (1964).
'715 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1966).
18The Act states that for the purposes of § 2(11), which defines "underwriter,"
the term issuer includes also "any person directly or indirectly controlling or
controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control
with the issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1963). Sommer, Who's "In Control"?, 21
Bus. LAW. 559 (1966).
19The Act defines underwriter as, first, a person who has purchased securities
from an issuer, or person in control of an issuer, with a view to their distribution;
second, a person who offers or sells securities for an issuer or person in control
of an issuer, in connection with their distribution; or, third, a person directly or
indirectly participating in the underwriting of any such undertaking. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(11) (1963).
20The Act defines dealer as "any person who engages either for all or part of
his time, directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of
offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by
another person." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(12) (1963).
21Section 4(2) of the Act exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1966). If a person purchasing pursuant
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of the opinion that the "purchase for investment" exemption would
include foreclosure sales of unregistered securities by a bona fide
pledgee.
The decisional support for this theory was meager. The Commis-
sion in a case decided in 193922 had, at least by implication, indicated
that sales by bona fide pledgees were exempt. Much later a court ex-
pressed "doubt on the issue of whether or not a sale of collateral by
a bona fide pledgee. . . can result in any liability to the pledgor or
pledgee." 23 Therefore, Guild Films was a case of first impression.
I. THE GUILD FILMS CASE
Guild Films arose when movie-maker Hal Roach was faced by the
demand of his bankers that he supply additional collateral for some
long overdue personal notes. Roach therefore caused a wholly-owned
subsidiary of a corporation in which he was a controlling shareholder
to purchase unregistered stock from Guild Films. 24 The stock had
been acquired by this corporation pursuant to an investment represen-
tation 25 and the share certificates had been legended.2 6 How Roach
to the so-called "private placement exemption" at a later date has a valid change
of circumstances, then he can sell these shares pursuant to the exemption in
Section 4(0) of the Act without registration. United States v. Abrams, 357
F.2d 539, 547 (2d Cir. 1966); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962;
SEC Securities Act Release No. 603, Dec. 16, 1935; Sargent, Private Offering
Exemption, 21 Bus. LAW. 118, 122 (1965); Orrick, Some Interpretive Problems
Respecting the Registration Requirenents under the Securities Act, 13 Bus. LAW.
369, 375 (1958). Just what constitutes a valid change of circumstances is unclear
and recently the Investment Bankers Association has requested that the Commis-
sion promulgate specific rules for sale of stock previously purchased subject to
the "private placement exemption." Wall Street Journal, May 3, 1966, p. 4,
cols. 2-3.
22Sweet's Steel Co., 4 S.E.C. 589 (1939).
23F. L. Jacobs Co. v. Inland Credit Corp., CCH FED. Sac. L. REp. 90908
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
24Roach was an officer, director and the controlling shareholder of F. L. Jacobs
Co. This company controlled Scranton Corp., whose wholly-owned subsidiary,
Hal Roach Studios, in turn owned W-R Corp. and Rabco T.V. Productions, Inc.
W-R Corp. purchased stock from Guild Films, which covenanted that it would
use its best efforts to register the stock. The stock was issued, however, by
Guild pursuant to the private offering exemption under § 4(2) of the Act. Interest-
ingly enough, F. L. Jacobs Co. was the plaintiff in the action cited in note 23,
supra. Alexander L. Guterma was president of F. L. Jacobs Co. and was, con-
temporary with Roach's Guild Films problems, having securities problems of his
own. United States v. Guterma, 181 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), 281 F.2d 742
(1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 (1960).
25This representation stated that the shares "are being acquired for investment
only and not for the purpose or with the intention of distributing or reselling the
same to others. Guild is relying on said warranty and representation in the
issuance of said stock." 279 F.2d 485, 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
26The legend on the face of the certificate read, "The shares represented by
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came into possession of this stock is not explained, but he ultimately
pledged this stock as further collateral for his personal loans. Upon
default the banks attempted to sell the unregistered stock and the
Commission sought to enjoin the sale as violative of the registration
requirements of § 5 of the Act.
The district court, in granting a preliminary injunction, said:
The Act prohibits purchases with a view to distribution. If the
Santa Monica Bank is a bona fide pledgee now seeking to sell col-
lateral it acquired in good faith to secure the debt, it would not
appear to come within the statutory prohibition ....
The fact that a pledgee as such is not exempt by the Act is not
significant, since the activities prescribed by their terms exclude a
pledge transaction. The touchstone to the transaction is the good
faith of the parties ... a good faith consisting not of an abuse
of intent to evade the statute, but an absence of intent on the part
of the one delivering the property that it be sold and an absence
of intent on the part of the one receiving it, at the time he re-
ceives the property [,] to sell it.27
The district court then held that when Roach purchased the addi-
tional collateral "he did so in order to have the Santa Monica Bank sell
it for his benefit, since he himself could not, and by so doing he be-
came an underwriter under Sec. 2(11) .... The Santa Monica Bank,
in turn, was no more interested than Roach in acquiring stock which
it could not liquidate promptly ... ." 28 The court thus held that the
banks were statutory underwriters. The sale of such collateral by
statutory underwriters would have violated the Act and was therefore
enjoinable.
As Professor Loss notes, "if the last word had remained with the
this certificate have not been registered under the Securities Act of 1933. The
shares have been acquired for investment and may not be sold, transferred,
pledged or hypothecated in the absence of an effective registration statement
for the shares under the Securities Act of 1933 or an opinion of counsel to the
Company that registration is not required under said Act." 279 F.2d 485, 487
(2d Cir. 1960). The agreement containing the investment representation, note 25
supra, was dated about two weeks earlier than the stock certificate. The legend on
the stock certificate is much broader than the earlier investment representation,
which did not specifically refer to a pledge. Although the Second Circuit later
found that the banks knew that they had received unregistered stock subject to
the restrictive legend, 279 F.2d 485, 490 (1960), of which they certainly had con-
structive notice, it is possible that through inadvertence or oversight the banks
were unaware of the legend.
27178 F. Supp. 418,423 (SD.N.Y. 1959).
281d. at 424.
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District Court, or if its judgment had been affirmed on the same
reasoning, the case would have served only to confirm the traditional
administrative view with respect to pledges as it had been generally
understood." - On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
completely overruled this traditional view, although it upheld the
injunction.
The Second Circuit held first that the bank had purchased with a
view to the distribution of the Guild Films stock:
The banks cannot be exempted on the ground that they did not
"purchase" within the meaning of § 2(11). The term, although not
defined in the Act, should be interpreted in a manner comple-
mentary to "sale" which is defined in § 2(3) as meaning "every
** * disposition *** a security or interest in a security for value
* * " 30
The most critical portion of the Second Circuit's decision was the
utter rejection of the good faith test. The banks argued that they
were bona fide pledgees and therefore were "entitled upon default to
sell the stock free of restrictions." The district court had met this
defense squarely by holding, in the language quoted above, that the
banks were not good faith pledgees as they had acquired the Guild
Films stock not as security for the Roach loan but for the sole purpose
of selling to effectuate repayment of the loan.
In attacking the good faith test enunciated by the district court,
the Second Circuit said:
[T]he statute does not impose such a "good faith" criterion. The
exemption in § [4(2)] was intended to permit private sales of un-
registered securities to investors who are likely to have, or who
are likely to obtain, such information as is ordinarily disclosed in
-registration statements. . . . The "good faith" of the banks is
irrelevant to this purpose. It would be of little solace to pur-
chasers of worthless stock to learn that the sellers had acted "in
good faith." Regardless of good faith, the banks engaged in steps
necessary to this public sale, and cannot be exempted.31
2 9Loss, SEcuRiTiEs REGULATION, 647 (2d ed. 1961). Skiatron Electronics and Tel-
evision Corp., Sec. Act Rel. No. 4282 (Oct. 3, 1960).
30279 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
311d. at 490. Apparently, however, the pledgor is not in a position to raise as a
defense that a bank by a foreclosure sale might violate the investment requirements
of the Act, since the pledgor "is the owner of the stock to be sold and not an
investor. Moreover, even assuming a dual involvement by the [pledgor] which
could be brought about by his bidding at the auction sale, he would still be an
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The result of Guild Films has been confusion,32 but apparently a
pledgee by the mere acceptance of a pledge of unregistered securities
has made a purchase with a view to distribution.33 If he then sells the
stock, he becomes a statutory underwriter in the distribution of that
stock in spite of good faith in taking or selling the stock.34 In a
recent memorandum decision a court has questioned whether a note
collaterized with stock is not now illegal in and of itself in view of
Guild Films.35
Guild Films has been widely noted.30 Several writers suggest that
subsequent judicial interpretation may restrict the decision. Other
writers suggest remedial action, such as the enactment by Congress of
a specific exemption,37 the adoption by the Commission of an inter-
investor possessed 'of information thought necessary to informed investment de-
cisions."' Rogers v. Crown Stove Works, 236 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. III. 1964).
32Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
33The Commission has proposed to amend Rule 16a-6, pursuant to S 16a of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (a) (1966), to provide that a
pledge including the hypothecation of a security or the release of a security
from a pledge would be deemed such a change in the beneficial ownership of
the security pledged as to require corporate insiders to report such a change to
the Commission. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7794, Jan. 20, 1966.
If Rule 16a-6 is amended as proposed, the practical effect could well be that, for
the purposes of § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1966),
a pledge of securities by an insider would be a sale by the pledgor and a purchase
by the pledgee. The Commission on December 31, 1964, proposed to amend Form
8-K, a current report required by §§ 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m & o(d) (1966). This amendment, which has not
yet become effective, would require a report to be filed by the company whenever
securities of the company have been pledged under such circumstances that a
default may result in a change of control of the company. SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 7495, Dec. 31, 1964.
34Sec. Act Rel. No. 4552 (November 6, 1962); Sec. Act Rel. No. 4282 (October
3,1960).
351nvestment Corporation v. Murray, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91309 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). The suggestion raised by this opinion seems to miss the whole point of the
Guild Films decision, which presumably is applicable only to dispositions of
control or unregistered shares and not to dispositions exempt under § 4(1) of the
Act as transactions made by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer.
35S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS & IN UNDERWRITINGS 79 (Israels
ed. 1962); Loss, SECUmTIEs REGULATION 645 (2d ed. 1961); Pierce, SEC v. Guild
Films Co., Inc., 16 Bus. LAW. 603 (1961); Sargent, The "Guild Films" Case: The
Effect of "Good Faith" in Foreclosure Sales of Unregistered Securities Pledged as
Collateral, 46 VA. L. REv. 1573 (1960); 48 CALIF. L. REv. 841 (1960); 60 COLUM.
L. REv. 1179 (1960); [1960] Dura L.J. 638; 74 HARv. L. REv. 1241 (1961); 36
N.Y.U.L. REv. 901 (1961) 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 663 (1961); 13 STAN. L. REv. 652
(1961); 34 TEMP. L.Q. 323 (1961).37Pierce, SEC v. Guild Films Co., Inc., 16 Bus. LAW. 603 (1961). The writer
suggests the enactment of the language considered but not accepted by Congress
in 1933, as quoted in note 3 supra.
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pretive rule that a bona fide pledgee does not come within the first
and second clauses38 of the definition of undervriter,39 or the adoption
by the Commission of a rule which would permit bona fide pledgees
to issue a "quit claim" offering circular, presumably setting forth the
facts of the acquisition, pledge, and default, after which the pledgee
could sell the securities at public auction without warranty or repre-
sentation 40
Guild Films is, of course, of concern not only to commercial banks
but also to finance and insurance companies and all other commer-
cial and non-commercial lenders who take pledges of securities as col-
lateral for their loans. The practical problems with which such pledgees
are faced upon default are essentially ones of time and expense. In
order to protect themselves, many pledgees now secure from the bor-
rower a covenant that, at the election of the pledgee, the borrower
will use his best efforts to obtain registration and will bear the ex-
penses of the registration. However, this may be of little value when
upon default the pledgee is left to deal with an hostile and possibly
insolvent issuer. Assuming, however, that the issuer is solvent and fully
cooperative regarding registration of the pledged shares, under the best
possible circumstances today probably a minimum of sixty days will
have elapsed between the decision to register and the effective date
of the registration statement. In many instances market economics
simply will not permit this delay.
Since Guild Films, some lenders have begun to use as security for
a loan secured by control or unregistered stock a "take out" or "pick
up" letter. Typically, a solvent third party will agree with the bank
that upon the demand of the lender or upon default by the pledgor
the third party will either purchase or will secure a party who will
purchase the pledged stock.4 1 The third party further agrees that at
the time he purchases the stock he will execute an investment letter,
which is a letter from the purchaser of the securities representing that
he is purchasing the securities for investment and not for the purpose
of distribution.4 This representation forms the basis for a claimed
3SSee language quoted in note 11 supra.
3 9Loss, SECURITIES REGULATiON 650 (2d ed. 1961).
40S.E.C. PROBLEiS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS & IN UNDERWRITINGS 86 (Israels
ed. 1962).
41Cf. Able Finance Company v. Whitaker, 388 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
42An investment letter thus contains basicly the language of the representation
given by Roach to Guild Films quoted in note 25 supra. An example of a well
drafted investment letter is published in S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCK-
HOLDERS & IN UNDERWERTNGS 27 (Israels ed. 1962). For further comment concerning
the use of investment letters, see Sommer, Who's "In ControP?, 21 Bus. LAW.
559, 585-86 (1966) and SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962.
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exemption on the part of the lender that under § 4(2) of the Act
such disposition of the securities is a private placement not requiring
registration. This arrangement assures the lender that there will be a
ready and immediate market for the sale of the pledged securities
should the pledgor default on his obligations.
The recent decision in Meadow Brook National Bank v. Levine43
illustrates the procedure. After the bank had first demanded additional
collateral, the father of the pledgor gave to the bank a "take out" letter
agreeing to purchase the notes and pledged securities of his daughter
from the bank. The father then defaulted on his agreement. As a
defense to the suit of the bank for breach of contract, the father urged
that the "take out" letter was void and in violation of the registration
requirements of the Act since he "lacked any knowledge or informa-
tion concerning the status or financial condition [of the issuer of the
stock pledged to the bank by his daughter]" and since he had "agreed
to acquire the shares not as an investor, but rather, for the purpose of
selling them on the open market." 4
4
The court refused to strike the defense at this stage of the proceed-
ings and held that triable issues of fact had been raised. The court, how-
ever, indicated that if the defendant could prove that "the contract
was knowingly entered into in order to circumvent the requirements
of the federal legislation and was designed to accomplish that which
the legislation specifically had forbidden," as the defendant had alleged,
then the "take out" letter would not be enforceable.45 Meadow Brook
is silent as to whether the "take out" letter included an investment
representation.
Another possible solution for the pledgee is use of Rule 154.40 The
Act defines an underwriter as including a controlling person.47 Al-
though the Act does not define "control," the term generally in-
cludes "either the power to control or the actual exercise of control"
of the issuer of the securities.48 For instance, certainly Roach was in
control of the corporation whose wholly owned subsidiary originally
acquired the Guild Films stock.49
43CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91496 (1965).
44CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91496, p. 94,870 (1965).
45CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91496, p. 94,871 (1965). The outcome of this case is,
unfortunately, not yet of record.
4617 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1964). Sommer, Who's "In Control"?, 21 Bus. LAw. 559,
588 (1966); Hill, Rule 154 under the Securities Act of 1933 and Related Problems-
A Proposed Solution, 20 Bus. LAw. 335, 340 (1965); S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CON-
TROLLING STOCKHOLDERS & IN UNDERwRITNGS 65 (Israels ed. 1962).
47Supra note 18.
4 8Sommer, Who's "In Con'trol"? 21 Bus. LAW. 559, 565 (1966).
4 9Supra note 24.
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A controlling person is not in an enviable position, at least in so far
as the saleability of his control stock is concerned. Even if his stock
is not investment letter stock and the controlling person has pur-
chased on the open market stock which had previously been registered
by the issuer, the mere fact that he is a controlling person means that
this stock must be registered before it can be resold. As discussed
above, the Act defines the term underwriter as including a person in
control of an issuer and a statutory underwriter 50 must for all prac-
tical purposes meet the registration requirements of the Act before he
makes any distribution.5
The Commission has allowed some relief to the control person by
promulgating Rule 154. This rule allows an exemption from the reg-
istration requirements to a broker who acts as agent for the controlling
person in the sale of limited amounts of control securities in a six
months' period. The Rule, however, places stringent limitations upon
the broker in the sale. For instance, the amount of securities which
may be sold under the Rule is limited. With securities sold over-the-
counter, no more than one per cent of the securities outstanding may
be sold. In the case of securities listed upon a securities exchange,
the limit is the lesser of one per cent of the securities outstanding or
the largest aggregate reported volume of stock traded during any week
of the preceding month.
If it appears that there is a plan to effect a series of sales every
six months, the Commission has made it clear that it will consider the
transactions as a part of a distribution.52 Therefore, the Rule, if it is to
be utilized, must be used infrequently and with great caution. All
sales by the controlling person, whether made pursuant to this Rule
or not, are included in the numerical computation.
The Rule was promulgated by the Commission under the provisions
of § 4(4) of the Act which exempt from the registration requirements
"brokers' transactions, executed upon the customers' orders on any ex-
change or in the over-the-counter market but not solicitation of such
orders." 5 Thus the Commission has stated that this exemption is
available only to brokers.54 The controlling person would generally
find his exemption under § 4(1) of the Act which exempts transactions
not involving issuers, underwriters or dealers. 5
50A statutory underwriter is a person defined by § 2(11) of the Act as an
underwriter, who may not be an investment banker at all. See note 18 supra.
5115 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1966).
52SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818, Jan. 21, 1966.
5315 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1966).
54SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818, Jan. 21, 1966.
5515 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1966).
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A pledgee may find relief under Rule 154, but here again the
Commission takes the position that other dispositions of the con-
trolling shareholder during the six months' period must be counted in
the calculation of the amount of shares the pledgee can sell under
the Rule. ° Whether the controlling person has abused use of the
Rule in the past, or will do so in the future, is of real concern to the
pledgee in determining whether to utilize the Rule.
The Commission takes the further position that Rule 154 is not
available to a controlling person who holds investment letter stock
"if under then existing circumstances public sale of any of the se-
curities would be inconsistent with an intention on the latter's part at
the time he acquired the securities to hold them for investment." 17
Thus to utilize the Rule in the case of investment letter stock, the
pledgee must at his peril discover whether there has been a valid
change of circumstances on the part of the pledgor, a task which
is never easy.58 For all of these reasons, Rule 154 may not be the
answer to the pledgee's dilemma.
Controlling shareholders today have the same requirements for fi-
nancing as do other investors. However, in view of the quandary in
which lending institutions currently find themselves as a result of
Guild Films, it is safe to assert that fewer loans secured with con-
trol, investment letter, or other unregistered stock as collateral are
being made today. Short of remedial legislation, the promulgation of
some sort of rule by the Commission, or further judicial clarification
of the situation, what solution is left to the pledgee? In casting about
for some resolution to his dilemma, the pledgee might well consider
the intrastate exemption.
II. THE INTRASTATE EXEMPTION
Section 3 (a) (11) of the Act exempts from the registration require-
ments of the Act:
Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to
persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the
issuer of such security is a person resident and doing business
within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business
within such State or Territory. 59
56SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818, Jan. 21, 1966.
57Ibid.
58Supra note 21.
5915 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11) (1963).
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This exemption was enacted to aid local financing and at first blush
appears to be relatively simple; however problems are encountered in
nearly every phrase. °
The Act provides that a corporate issuer must be both incorporated
by and doing business within the state. In a primary offering,6 it is
the Commission's view that the business done must be substantial; how-
ever this should not be germane in conjunction with a secondary
offering, 2 such as a sale by a pledgee, since the pledgee, if not itself
a controlling person, would not have the power to determine whether
the issuer's business in that state was substantial. The Commission
also takes the position that the requirement that the offerees and pur-
chasers must be persons resident within the state means "domiciled."
This has been criticized by Professor Loss, who argues that "the skilled
draftsmen of the statute did choose to say 'resident' rather than 'domi-
ciled'." 0
The Commission has stated that a "basic condition of the exemption
is that the entire issue be offered and sold exclusively to residents of
the state in question." Consequently an offer or sale outside the state
by the pledgee or pledgor or the resale outside the state by one of
the purchasers from the pledgee during the period of distribution by
the pledgee would, in the view of the Commission, render the exemp-
tion unavailable to the entire offering. 4
The question thus arises as to whether the intrastate exemption
would be available to pledgees in what would be a secondary distribu-
tion. The Commission has stated that "a secondary offering by a con-
trolling person in the issuer's state of incorporation may be made in re-
liance on a Section 3(a) (11) exemption provided the exemption
would be available to the issuer for a primary offering in that state." "
Inasmuch as Guild Films places the pledgee in the same position as
a controlling person, it would seem that this is good authority that
a pledgee may also rely on the intrastate exemption.
When the issuer is incorporated and is doing business in Virginia,
60The intrastate exemption has been discussed comprehensively by the Com-
mission. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434, Dec. 6, 1961.
61A primary offering is an offering by the issuer.
62A secondary offering is an offering by shareholders rather than by the issuer.
63Loss, SEcURiTnEs REGULATiON 598 (2d ed. 1961).
641t is usual for the issuer, underwriter, or dealer, in restricting a primary
offering to residents of one state, to require representations from the purchasers
that they are bona fide residents of the state and that the purchases are not made
for the purpose of resale. Frequently, the share certificates also are legended.
WmEN CoRpORA-IONS Go PUBLmc 34 (Israels & Duff ed. 1962).
65SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434, Dec. 6, 1961.
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would the fact that the pledgee is a resident of or incorporated in
New York destroy any reliance upon the exemption? The Commis-
sion has said that "it is not essential that the' controlling person be a
resident of the issuer's state of incorporation," and further "it may
be noted that the non-residence of the underwriter or dealer is not
pertinent so long as the ultimate distribution is solely to residents of
the state." 66 Therefore, the non-residency of the pledgee, who Guild
Films holds is a statutory underwriter, does not destroy a claim of the
exemption, and a pledgee resident in New York could then come into
Virginia, make his intrastate sale, and the sale would then be exempt
from the registration provisions of the Act.
III. BLUE SKY PLEDGEE EXEMPTIONS
Once the pledgee has determined that the intrastate exemption under
§ 3(a) (11) of the Act is available to him, must he then register under
the Blue Sky laws of the state where the sale is to be made? As each
state has its own securities laws, no blanket answer can be given.
However, one of the most universal of all exemptions from the regis-
tration provisions under state laws is the pledgee exemption, which
exists in forty-five jurisdictions.67
661bid.
67 A labama: Ala. Code tit. 53, S 38(g) (1940); Alaska: Alaska Star. § 45.55.140
(b) (12) (1962); Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Star. Ann. § 44-1844(2) (1956); Arkansas: Ark.
Acts, 5 14(b) (7) (1959); California: Cal. Corp. Code § 25151 (1949); Colorado:
Colo. Rev. Star. Ann. § 125-1-13 (2) (a) (b) (1963); Florida: Fla. Star. Ann. § 517.06
(2) (1957); Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 22-1833 (1965); Hawaii: Hawaii Rev. Laws
§ 199-5 (g) (1957); Idaho: Idaho Code Ann. S 26-1802 (b) (1947); Illinois: Ill. Laws
§ 4(E) (1953); Indiana: Ind. Laws § 102(b) (7) (1961); Iowa: Iowa Code Ann.
§ 502.5(2) (1962); Kansas: Kan. Laws § 17-1262(e) (1959); Kentucky: Ky. Rev.
Star. § 292, 410 (7) (1960); Louisiana: La. Rev. Star. § 51:705(2) (1950); Maryland:
Md. Laws § 26(B) (7) (1962); Massachusetts: Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110A, § 3(c)
(1932); Michigan: Mich. Laws § 402(b) (7) (1964); Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. 5
80.06(6) (1961); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 26 (1960); Missouri: Mo. Rev.
Star. § 409.050(2) (1959); Montana: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 15-2014(6) (1947);
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Star. § 11(7) (Supp. 1965); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Star. §
90.080.6(a) (1965); New Mexico: N.M. Star. Ann. § 48-18-22(G) (1965); New
York: N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law S 359-f(1) (m); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Star. §
78-4(2) (1943); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 10-04-06.2 (1951); Ohio: Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.03 (E) (Baldwin 1964); Oklahoma: Olda. Star. Ann. tit.
71, § 401(b) (7) (1961); Pennsylvania: Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 70, § 32(4) (1941); Puerto
Rico: P.R. Laws § 402(b) (7) (1963); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 7-11-
8(k) (1956); South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. S 62-52(7) (1962); South Dakota:
S.D. Code § 55.1904(6) (1939); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-1632 (A) (1963);
Texas: Texas Laws Ch. 269, § 5(B) (1957); Utah: Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-14(2) (g)
(1953); Vermbnt: Vt. Star. tit. 9, S 4204(2) (1959); Virginia: Va. Code Ann.
§ 13.1-514(b) (1) (1950); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code S 21.20.320(7) (1961);
West Virginia: W. Va. Code Ann. S 3.064 (1961); Wisconsin: Wis. Star. S
189.07(8) (1961); and Wyoming: Wyo. Comp. Star: § 14(B) (7) (1965).
GUILD FILMS
The Uniform Securities Act"" in § 402(b) (7) exempts from the
registration provisions9 "any transaction executed by a bona fide
pledgee without any purpose of evading this act." Nineteen jurisdic-
tions have enacted the language of the Uniform Act verbatim.70
Twenty-six other states have the exemption from the registration
requirements in some form, 7' several with obvious typographical
errors. 72 Of the states which have not adopted the language of the
Uniform Act, only Virginia broadly exempts a transaction by a
pledgee, as does the Uniform Act. The other twenty-five states exempt
a sale by a pledgee. In addition to "sale," California also exempts
"offering for sale," while Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri,
New York, Texas and Vermont exclude from the exemption "sale,"
"offering for sale," and "delivery." Where the Uniform Act exempts
from the registration provisions "a transaction executed by a bona fide
pledgee without any purpose of evading this act," nine states exempt
a "sale in good faith";73 seventeen exempt sales made "in the ordinary
689C U.LA. § 101-419 (1957). The Uniform Securities Act is hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "Uniform Act."
6099C U.L.A. § 301 (1957).
70Alabana, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico,
South Carolina, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
71Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
72The statutes of California, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas and Vermont refer to
"security pledged." Where the obvious intent is for the similar Idaho and North
Carolina statutes to exempt from the registration requirements the sale by a
pledgee of a security pledged in good faith as security for such debt, the statutes
of these two states refer instead to a "security pledge." [This word is, however,
quoted as "pledged" in the CCH Blue Sky Rep. t 15102 and 36104, reporting
the Idaho and North Carolina statutes.] This changes the entire meaning of the
sentence and leads to speculation whether the statutes as enacted exempt only
the pledge of the securities by the pledgor and not the subsequent sale of the stock
by the pledgee.
Georgia and Tennessee exempt "the sale in good faith and not for the purpose
of avoiding the act by a pledge [sic] of securities pledged for a bona fide debt."
Here, pledge obviously should read pledgee [cf. the statutes of Arizona, Illinois,
Mississippi, North Dakota and Ohio which refer to pledgee] and the error makes
a substantial difference. This language would indicate that the pledge is a sale and
that this is the exempted transaction rather than the subsequent sale of the
security by the pledgee. If this be so, the law in these states would now be the
same as that announced in Guild.Films.
73Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, West
Virginia and Wisconsin.
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course of business"; 74 and thirteen exclude from the exemption sales
made to evade the provisions of the Act.75 In place of the test of
"bona fide pledgee" of the Uniform Act, many states extend the
exemption from the registration requirements only to securities
pledged for a "bona fide debt" 76 or "securities pledged in good faith
as security for the debt." 77 Florida, Iowa, Louisiana and Vermont
have verbatim the language which was considered but not adopted
by Congress,78 and Idaho, Missouri, New York, North Carolina and
Texas have substantially the same language. Rather than exempting a
pledge transaction, Nevada simply makes its act inapplicable to such
a transaction by excluding "any bona fide pledge" from the definitions
of offer and sale. In 1932 the Ninth Circuit 9 held that under the Cali-
fornia statute a pledge is a "disposition ... of [an] interest in a security
for value"; hence, a "sale." 80 Contrariwise, the Kentucky Attorney
General held in 1965 that an "agreement to pledge stock as collateral for
a loan does not constitute a 'sale' or 'transfer' of the stock" without
evidence to show an intention on the part of the parties that the pledge
operate as a sale so that title to the stock will be transferred without
any attempt to liquidate the securities."'
The North Dakota statute is noteworthy in two respects. First, it is
applicable only if the number of securities sold does not exceed two
per cent of the entire issue of each issue of such securities outstanding.
Assuming that this means two per cent of the authorized and issued
securities of any one class, the limitation places an additional obligation
of investigation upon the lender. Second, unless the securities them-
selves are otherwise exempted by the Act, the pledgee must receive
written permission of the Commissioner of Securities before proceed-
ing to sell the pledged securities.
74California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
75Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota,
Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
76Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West
Virginia and Wisconsin.
77California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas and Vermont.78Quoted in note 3 supra.
79Cecil B. DeMille Prods., Inc. v. Woolery, 61 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1932).
0At the time this case was decided, the California statute referred, as do the
Idaho and North Carolina statutes today, to a "security pledge." The statute
now reads "a security pledged ... "
81op. Atty. Gen. No. 65-675, CCH Blue Sky Rep. 70685 (1965).
GUILD FILMS
The Virginia statute is unique in that it is applicable only to isolated
transactions8 2 which are not effected directly or indirectly for the
benefit of the issuer.
IV. CONCLUSION
If a pledgee finds himself in a Guild Films situation and is able
to meet the tests for a valid intrastate exemption under the Act, it
seems quite possible that he can then take advantage of a state Blue
Sky pledgee exemption in the intrastate disposition of the pledged
securities. This appears to be a possible solution, perhaps frequently
overlooked, to the dilemma in which many lenders today find them-
selves.
82Most state acts contain an "isolated sale" or "small offering" exemption. Loss
& CowErr, BLuE SKY LAW 81-83, 369-74 (1958) discusses and collates the various
provisions. The corresponding exemption in the Federal Act is section 4(2), see
no:e 21 supra; 70 HARv. L. REv. 1438 (1957).
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